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IMF BANK-RESTRUCTURING EFFICIENCY OUTCOMES: 
EVIDENCE FROM EAST ASIA 
   
 
Abstract 
This paper reports new findings for the first time on bank efficiency over the pre- 
and post-IMF-restructuring periods for East Asia using the DEA and regression models. 
Bank closures that followed the IMF interventions are economically justified; but 
mergers and acquisitions experience short-term efficiency losses. Recapitalization and 
then re-privatization of bad banks have led to efficiency improvements, but still 
increased government ownership. Ease of entry has resulted in more foreign bank 
participation with improved performance; further spurts in improvements, however, may 
take longer time. These findings advocate bank restructuring during the crisis; but well-
designed measures are vital to ensure its success. Bank mergers and acquisitions need to 
be scrutinized. Privatization, particularly with strategic foreign ownership, of domestic 
banks which should be further encouraged. To reap the potential benefits of such foreign 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper is a modest attempt to fill a gap in the developing country individual banking 
studies relating to the most violent of the financial crises in recent decades, the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-98, by investigating the performance effects on individual banks 
resulting from the IMF-supported restructuring programs as a tool for performance 
enhancement. We select a sample of 138 commercial banks in four crisis-hit East Asian 
economies (Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand) and examine the 
restructuring effects over the pre- and post-restructuring years during 1991-2005.  
Since the late 1970s, 117 systemic banking crises
1 have occurred in 93 countries: 
more than two-thirds were in developing countries (Caprio and Klingebiel 2003). The 
IMF is charged with safeguarding the stability of the international monetary system. 
Thus, the central role for the IMF is to help restore confidence in the economies affected 
by the crisis by providing a stabilization financial package (a supported program). One of 
the main conditionalities in this supported program is to request the receiving country to 
undertake a comprehensive financial sector reform with a view to crisis resolution and 
performance improvement. Country examples of interventions during the 1990s include 
Mexico 1994-1995, East Asian countries (1997-1999), Brazil in 1999, Argentina in 2001 
and Turkey in 2001-02. Production efficiency as a measure of performance improvement 
of individual banks has yet been attempted for these cases.  
Broadly, the intervention takes predictable steps. Within the IMF program’s 
conditionality, the crisis-hit countries adopted various measures to restructure their 
banking systems, including closure of insolvent banks, encouraging or forcing domestic 
mergers, nationalization (recapitalization and re-privatization in a later stage), and 
allowing for foreign participation.  
 
1 A banking crisis is considered as “systemic” if it involves a widespread of banking failures that affect 
more than 20 percent of a banking system’s deposits (Sheng 1996).   3
                                                
A review of the literature on the IMF programs indicates that most studies of 
crisis intervention discuss the adoption, implementation, ownership, and impact of those 
programs on macroeconomic performance, not performance of the affected entities.
2 The 
IMF itself undertook several studies with the same focus reported in their studies. 
Several studies criticized the IMF-supported programs for not achieving the set 
objectives such as inflation control, for mitigating moral hazard behavior and preventing 
crisis-prone systems and encouraging collaboration with other international financial 
institutions such as the World Bank.
3 None of these studies, however, analysed the 
impacts that the IMF-supported programs have on the intervened banking markets.  
There have also been a growing number of studies on cross-country banking 
crises.
4 Existing studies mainly focus on describing the causes, consequences, lessons, 
speed and shape of general recovery (for example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detagiache 1998, 
Dell’Ariccia  et al. 2005). Banks’ poor overall performances such as poor financial 
indicators and high inefficiency have been claimed as a major cause of crises in 
developing countries (for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart 1998, Bongini et al. 2001). 
This link suggests that assessing bank performance in such as the selected developing 
countries cannot be disregarded. Yet, the performance of individual banks following a 
crisis is seldom investigated for developing countries. 
Moreover, whilst there are several cross-country studies on the effects of such 
factors as bank restructuring, deregulation, consolidation and privatization on bank 
performance, these were largely conducted for European economies.
5 Previous studies 
on the effects of East Asian bank restructuring on efficiency during 1991-2005 are still 
 
2 See Joyce (2004) for an extensive review of the IMF programs. 
3 See Sen (1998), and Alper and Onis (2002) for reviews of critics of the IMF programs. 
4 See Breuer (2004) for a review of currency and banking crises; and Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), and 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) for extensive surveys of systemic banking crises. 
5 See Berger and Humphrey (1997) for an extensive review of bank efficiency literature; see Berger et al. 
(1999) and Amel et al. (2004) for literature reviews of bank mergers and acquisitions, Megginson (2005) 
and Clarke et al. (2005) of bank privatization, and Detragiache et al. (2006) and Cull and Martinez-Peria 
(2007) of foreign bank entry.   4
very limited (only four studies). Most of these studies use data prior to the Asian banking 
crisis or single year data and report mixed results. Laeven (1999) investigates technical 
efficiency of East Asian banking and reported an increase in bank efficiency before the 
crisis, which was due to excessive risk-taking rather than a true increase in efficiency. 
Karim (2001), on the other hand, reports an increase in cost inefficiency of South East 
Asian banks during 1989-1996. Brown and Skully (2006) indicate that Asian Pacific 
banks in more developed financial markets enjoy higher cost efficiency in 2004. 
Williams and Nguyen (2005), the most comparable study to the present research, using 
the (parametric) stochastic frontier approach, investigated the relationship between bank 
profit efficiency and bank governance for South East Asian banks over 1990-2003. They 
suggest that private banks outperform state-owned banks, but no conclusion is made on 
foreign acquisition, nor of intervention dynamics. This paper attempts to fill several gaps 
in the existing literature by using a non-parametric technique (Data Envelopment 
Analysis, DEA) and regression analysis to examine technical and scale efficiency (and 
their determinants) of selected East Asian individual banks subjected to the IMF-
supported restructuring programs.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 below outlines the 
empirical literature on bank restructuring and efficiency. Section 3 contains a description 
of the methodology employed in greater detail. Section 4 discusses the empirical results, 
and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  RELATED LITERATURE 
Empirical evidence indicates two main approaches to evaluating the impact of the 
financial sector restructuring policies (under IMF-supported programs). The first 
concentrates on macroeconomic effects that are closely related to the ultimate goals of 
restructuring. For instance, several studies, including those by the IMF, examine the 
impact of supported programs on macroeconomic outcomes: growth (output), balance of   5
payments, unemployment, inflation, and fiscal deficits (for example, Haque and Khan 
1998, Joyce 2004; and IMF 2001a,b). 
An alternative approach is an analysis of specific systemic bank restructuring 
policies. Goldstein and Turner (1996) is the first attempt to suggest policy options for 
strengthening banking sectors as crisis prevention, while Sheng (1996) is the first to 
distill lessons from several bank restructuring programs. Other studies (see Tang et al. 
2000, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 2005) review various lessons and policy options. 
Bank restructuring under IMF-supported programs typically involves closure of 
insolvent banks, encouraging or forcing domestic mergers, nationalization 
(recapitalization and reprivatization in a later stage), and allowing for foreign 
participation.  
With respect to the empirical evidence on bank closures and efficiency, a handful 
of previous studies mainly investigate the link between bank failures (and possibly 
closures to follow) and inefficiency, and a majority on the U.S. banking markets. These 
studies show that banks and thrifts with low efficiency fail at greater rates than 
institutions with higher efficiency levels (Berger and Humphrey 1992a, Hermalin and 
Wallace 1994, Cebenoyan et al. 1993). Isik and Hassan (2003) provide evidence from a 
developing country. The results of their study of the Turkish banks around the crisis 
(1992-1996) suggest that banks experience a substantial productivity loss in the crisis-
year and small banks suffer the most. The two studies on South East Asian banking 
efficiency provide further evidence to this. Karim (2001) assesses cost efficiency of 
South East Asian banks during 1989-1996 and indicates that banks’ cost inefficiency 
tend to increase over the years preceding the crisis. Similarly, Williams and Nguyen 
(2005), in their analysis of profit efficiency and productivity of South East Asian banks 
over 1990-2003, shows that the closed banks have significantly lower profit efficiency, 
thus the region’s closure decisions can be supported on economic grounds.    6
                                                
On the second restructuring measure, recapitalization, previous studies focus on 
the rationale, techniques, costs and issues of recapitalization (see, for example, Tang et al. 
2000, Cheung and Liao 2005). Most recapitalized banks are then re-privatized, thus 
become major or fully private banks. The empirical literature somewhat indicates the 
favorable effect of bank privatization on efficiency, though varied across countries. 
Extensive surveys by Megginson (2005) and Clarke et al. (2005) document that bank 
privatization improves bank efficiency. Clarke et al. (2005) further stress that efficiency 
gains are greater when the government fully relinquishes control, when banks are 
privatized to strategic investors, when foreign banks are allowed to participate in the 
privatization process, and when the government does not restrict competition. Other 
studies of individual nations, which have gone through economic crisis and/or banking 
reform, including, for example, Argentina (Berger et al. 2005) and Pakistan (Bonaccorsi 
di Patti and Hardy 2005), generally find that at least one bank efficiency measure (cost, 
profit, revenue) improves following privatization.   
The empirical evidence on bank privatization from the East Asian banking 
markets is limited and inconclusive. Williams and Nguyen (2005) find that South East 
Asian state-owned banks underperform private and foreign-owned banks, and privatized 
banks improve efficiency after privatization. In contrast, Harada and Ito (2005), in their 
study of top 10 Indonesian banks, indicate no evidence of privatization effect on bank 
efficiency over 1999-2003.  
In respect of the impact of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on merged 
banks’ efficiency, the results are mainly drawn from the U.S. and European banking 
markets. Two extensive surveys by Berger et al. (1999) and Amel et al. (2004) indicate 
that bank M&As do not significantly improve cost and profit efficiency. 
6 Interestingly, 
 
6 There is evidence for the impact of bank M&As on scale efficiency, but only up to a size well below that 
of the most recent large deals. Scope efficiency is hard to pin down, and there is no clear-cut evidence of 
their existence (Amel et al. 2004, p. 2504).   7
                                                
no evidence of the impact of bank M&As on technical efficiency is found: this issue is 
explored in this paper. 
The evidence of the effects of East Asian bank M&As on efficiency is again very 
limited. The only cross-country study by Williams and Nguyen (2005) reports mixed 
results of the effects of bank M&As on profit and cost efficiency. Domestic M&As 
realize significant short-term profit efficiency gains but experience long-term profit 
efficiency loss, and exactly the opposite for cost efficiency. Large banks are more cost 
and profit efficient than small banks. Harada (2005) documents that efficiency of Korean 
banks deteriorates before crisis, but improves following mergers.  
Previous literature on the association between foreign ownership and efficiency 
provides somewhat mixed results; but overall, there is greater evidence to support the 
proposition that foreign-owned banks are generally more efficient than their domestic 
counterparts. For example, studies by Claessens et al (2001), Weill (2003), Kasman et al. 
(2005) report relatively superior efficiency scores for foreign-owned banks. In contrast, 
studies of developed countries by DeYoung and Nolle (1996) and Berger et al. (2000) 
report contrary results.
7 There is, however, very limited evidence on the effects of 
foreign acquisitions (participation) on bank efficiency, and the results are mixed. While 
Fries and Taci (2005) report that banks with majority foreign ownerships in transition 
economies are most efficient, Berger et al. (2005) report little deterioration in efficiency 
associated with foreign acquisitions in Argentine banks.  
Previous evidence on the relationship between foreign ownership and bank 
efficiency in the East Asian banking markets, though limited, is in line with the existing 
literature, which reports mixed but some favourable results for foreign ownership. 
Laeven (1999) indicates that foreign banks took little risk relative to other bank types in 
the region before the crisis. Studies by Karim (2001), Margono and Sharma (2004) and 
Williams and Nguyen (2005) provide evidence that private banks (domestic or foreign-
 
7 See Berger (2007) for an excellent review of the cross-country banking efficiency literature.   8
owned) are more efficient than state-owned banks. Other studies (Harada 2005, Choi and 
Hasan 2005) find that higher foreign ownership improves efficiency and outperforms 
other bank types. In addition, financial liberalization (which includes foreign bank entry) 
has positive effects on domestic bank efficiency and productivity (Leightner and Lovell 
1998, Park and Weber 2006). Unfortunately, very limited evidence on the effects of 
foreign acquisitions (participation) on the region’s bank efficiency could be found. The 
only comparable study (Williams and Nguyen 2005) indicates that potential benefits of 
foreign participation may take longer to be realized. 
In summary, the international empirical evidence on bank failures and efficiency 
generally indicates high inefficiency prior to failures, which supports closure decisions 
on economic grounds. The evidence on the impact of bank privatization, mergers and 
acquisitions, and foreign participation is somewhat mixed, although some favorable 
results are reported for bank privatization and foreign ownership. In the absence of 
guiding previous evidence and with the expectation that East Asian banks’ efficiency 
will improve after restructuring under the IMF-supported programs, the following 
hypothesis is formulated: 
HA:  The East Asian banks’ technical and scale efficiency will significantly 
improve after restructuring under IMF-supported programs after controlling for 
country-specific characteristics. 
 
3.  DATA AND METHOD 
The sample used consists of 138 domestic commercial banks operating in four crisis-hit 
East Asian countries with IMF-supported programs (Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, 
and Thailand) using data over 1991-2005. Entities such as development (specialized) 
banks, investment banks, savings banks, regional rural banks, joint-venture banks, and 
wholly-owned subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks are excluded from the sample 
to ensure homogeneity, thus comparability of the results with other studies.  The primary source of annual bank-specific data is the BANKSCOPE database, 
while the country-specific data were collected from International Financial Statistics, and 
other data sources including the IMF, World Bank, the four central banks, and Heritage 
Foundation and the Wall Street Journal. Annual cross-section and time series pooled 
(unconsolidated) data are used.  
Of the 138 banks included in the final sample, there are 66 Indonesian, 26 Korean, 
32 Filipino and 14 Thai banks. The sample accounts for asset coverage in each of the 
four banking markets ranging from a minimum of 68 percent in Korea to a maximum of 
82 percent in Indonesia. Most banks are private-owned (91 percent of the sample), while 
state-owned banks were 9 percent. There are 74 listed banks (54 percent) and 64 unlisted 
banks (46 percent) and the study covered both.  
As far as restructuring measures are concerned, only 30 percent of the banks did 
not experience any dramatic changes, the remainder (70 percent) underwent some form 
of restructuring (closure, merger and/or acquisition, recapitalization and then re-
privatization, and foreign participation). Among the 97 restructured banks, 54 banks 
were closed (or compulsorily merged into another bank), 22 banks underwent market 
mergers or acquisitions and are still operational, and the other 21 banks were 
recapitalized by the respective governments. Nine (out of these 21 recapitalized banks) 
were later re-privatized. In addition, both restructured and un-restructured banks (44) had 
foreign bank participation in the form of acquisition or equity capital contribution. 
Finally, the whole sample contains 1,326 bank-year observations over 1991-2005.
8  
Firm-specific efficiency scores are calculated using parametric or nonparametric 
methods, and each method has its own merits and drawbacks. The nonparametric method 
is used in this paper for several reasons. First, the nonparametric methods such as DEA
9 
  9
                                                 
8 A list of the sample banks with their characteristics and restructuring measures is available upon request. 
9DEA is a nonparametric mathematical programming approach to efficiency frontier estimation, pioneered 
by Farrell (1957), and then developed by Charnes et al. (1978) who proposed a model assuming constant 
returns to scale, and extended by Banker et al. (1984) to allow for variable returns to scale. The efficiency   10
                                                                                                                                                
allow studies of jointly-produced multiple outputs, whereas the parametric methods are 
normally limited to focusing on a single dependent variable, such as cost, revenue or 
profit (Avkiran 2002, p. 50).
10 Second, price information is generally regarded as being 
necessary for the parametric techniques. The prices of such required inputs/outputs may 
be distorted due to regulations and other market imperfections in developing countries, 
and therefore, may complicate the measurement of cost and/or profit functions using 
parametric approaches (Ataullah et al. 2004, p. 1917). The nonparametric methods, on 
the other hand, can be used for efficiency assessment without this price information.  
Another reason is that, as Cooper et al. (2000) described, in the nonparametric 
DEA, measurement units of different inputs and outputs do not need to be congruent, 
thus stock and flow variables can be dealt with in the same model. DEA thus can address 
both quantitative and qualitative data, and discretionary and non-discretionary variables. 
This became an important consideration in cross-country banking studies that 
incorporate environmental variables as in this paper. Fourth, the nonparametric 
approaches also provide meaningful scalar technical efficiency and scale efficiency 
measures (Favero and Papi 1995). Finally, most existing studies have already used 
parametric methods to examine efficiency of East Asian banks, it is therefore pertinent to 
see whether the DEA-based efficiency scores support the conclusions reached by those 
existing studies but applied to IMF cases.  
  DEA models commonly have either an input or output orientation. This study 
chooses the input-oriented model
11 since from the bank management’s perspective; it is 
easier to control over inputs than outputs. In addition, as theory is silent as to the best 
 
measures generated by the technique are relative measures (indices) of efficiency, not absolute measures, 
ranging from zero (for the least efficient) to one (for the “best-practice” firms). See Coelli et al. (2005) for 
further details. 
10 The parametric distance functions developed by Coelli and Perelman (1999) can now be applied to 
multiple output technologies.  
11 An input orientation aims at reducing the input amounts as much as possible while keeping at least the 
present output levels, while an output orientation aims at maximizing output levels without increasing use 
of inputs (Cooper et al. 2000, p.103). orientation to apply, this study follows the approach adopted in similar cross-country 
banking efficiency studies (for example, Lozano-Vivas et al. 2002, Kasman et al. 2005). 
The DEA model can be under either constant returns to scale (CRS, hereinafter) or 
variable returns to scale (VRS, hereinafter) assumptions. In this paper, both CRS and 
VRS assumptions are investigated, from which scale efficiency of the sample banks can 
be identified. In line with Coelli et al. (2005), the following input-oriented CRS DEA 




      subject to            0 ≥ + − λ Y yi
    0 ≥ − λ X xi θ   
   z i- Zλ ≥ 0       
0 ≥ λ                                                                          (Equation 3.1)     
Equation 3.1 above is based on the assumption that there are K inputs and M 
outputs for each of N firms. For firm i , these vectors are represented by x  and yi  i
respectively. The (KxN) input matrix, X, and the (MxN) output matrix, Y, represent the 
data of all N firms. Similarly, assuming there are L environmental variables, these vectors 
are represented by z i for firm i and by (LxN) matrix Z for N firms. Parameter θ is a 
scalar, λ is a (Nx1) vector of constants. The value of θ obtained is the efficiency score of 
firm i. It satisfies θ ≤ 1, with a value of 1 indicating a point on the frontier, and hence a 
technically efficient firm according to Farrell (1957) definition. With regard to the scale 
assumptions, Equation 3.1 represents the CRS DEA model, while the VRS DEA model is 
generated by Equation 3.1 plus the convexity constraint ( 1 ' 1 = λ N ).  
The calculation of scale efficiency (SE) then can be done by comparing the 
differences in technical efficiency (TE) scores generated by the CRS and VRS DEA 
  11models. If there is a difference in the two efficiency scores, then this indicates existence of 
scale efficiency, SE. Following Coelli (1996b), the SE for firm i can be calculated as: 






,                        (Equation 3.2)   
where SE i is the scale efficiency, TE is the technical efficiency score under CRS, and  crs i,
TE is the technical efficiency score under VRS assumptions.  vrs i,
  There are two broad competing theories of banking service provision: the 
production approach and the intermediation approach. Under the production approach, 
banks are regarded as using labor and capital to produce deposits and loans. In contrast, 
the intermediation approach views banks as intermediaries with loans and other earning 
assets as outputs, and capital, labor and deposits as inputs (Sealey and Lindley 1977). 
There is also a “dual” approach which treats amounts of deposits as an output and the 
price of deposits as an input (Berger and Humphrey 1991).   
Following Isik and Hassan (2003), and Casu et al. (2004), the intermediation 
approach is used in this study. To capture the most significant activities of banks; 3 
inputs (purchased funds, labour and physical capital) and 2 outputs (loans and other 
earning assets) are employed in Equation 3.1.  
Finally, since DEA is very sensitive to outliers (Hartman et al. 2001, Hughes and 
Yaisawarng 2004) and as a further check for the consistency of the input and output 
variables used, an input-oriented CRS super-efficiency model was run for each annual 
data set in the study to identify any units as outliers. Following Hartman et al. (2001), a 
cut-off point of 2 was used. As a result, one bank being an outlier in all years was 
removed from the sample; three other banks which were outliers in two or three years 
were removed from the sample in those years only.  
Previous cross-country studies stress the importance of controlling for country-
specific environmental conditions in cross-country studies (see, for instance, Dietsch and 
Lozano-Vivas 2000, Lozano-Vivas et al. 2002, Psiouras 2008b). Following these recent 
  12  13
                                                
developments in the cross-country banking literature, this study introduces country-
specific variables directly into the DEA efficiency model.  
Based on the variables identified in similar studies by Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas 
(2000), Lozano-Vivas et al. (2002), and Kasman et al. (2005), ten environmental 
variables categorized into two main groups are initially selected. The first group named 
“main conditions” includes measures of population density, density of demand, income 
per capital, interest rate level, inflation rate, and overall economic condition. The second 
group, “banking and financial conditions”, consists of degree of concentration, depth of 
bank intermediation, degree of monetization, and degree of regulatory restrictions. In 
addition, given the choice of restructuring measures should depend on the level of 
difficulties that each banking system faces, a fifth variable as a proxy of average asset 
quality is also considered.
12 These variables characterize the structure, competition and 
critical problem of a banking industry. Data limitations prevented us from investigating 
the impact of political connections on the implementation of the restructuring measures, 
which could in turn influence banking efficiency during the study period.
13 
Once the eleven environmental variables are identified, the forward selection 
procedure (see Lozano-Vivas et al. 2002) is utilized. This approach helps to minimize 
the number of variables incorporated into the DEA model by statistically selecting only 
those influential environmental variables. Consequently, five out of eleven 
environmental variables were found to be influential and thus included in the complete 
model. These are: degree of monetization, density of demand, population density, overall 
economic condition, and average asset quality. Following Lozano-Vivas et al. (2002), 
 
12  Berger and DeYoung (1997), and Girardone, Molyneux and Gardener (2004) suggest that banking 
efficiency is negatively correlated to the level of non-performing loans in the US and Italian banking 
systems respectively. 
13 Bongini, Claessens and Ferri (2001), in their study of the political economy of distress of the East Asian 
banks in 1996, find that “connections” - with industrial groups or influential families - increased the 
probability of distress and made closure more likely. Nevertheless, the number of these company- and 
family-owned banks in five East Asian countries declined sharply after the crisis, from 73 in 1996 to only 
9 banks in 2002 (Williams and Nguyen 2005, Table 1). the first four variables are considered as the output-type ones (that is, the higher, the 
better), and thus must be introduced as inputs in the DEA model. The fifth variable, 
average asset quality measured by non-performing loans to total loans, is an input-type 
variable (the lower, the better), and thus must be included as an output, or can be 
transformed into a non-discretionary input by reversing its sign and translating it. We 
opted for the latter so that all the five environmental variables are included as inputs in 
the DEA model. As such, this complete model has ten variables, including three basic 
inputs, two basic outputs, and five environmental variables as defined in Table 3.1.  
The Zhu (2003)’s DEA-Solver software allows for a single-step calculation of the 
technical efficiency scores under this complete model with CRS assumption. The DEA 
complete model with VRS assumption is also estimated so as to calculate the scale 
efficiency. These estimated technical and scale efficiency scores are then employed in 
the regression model to identify determinants of bank efficiency.  
Alternative regression methods including ordinary least squares (OLS), 
generalized least squares (GLS), Logistic and Tobit regressions are employed in the 
literature for this purpose. The Tobit censored regression is used for a main reason that it 
can take into account the censored nature of the dependent variable (that is, efficiency 
scores, ranging from zero to one), thus reportedly yielding consistent estimates. To 
control heteroscedasticity and following Isik and Hassan (2003), we use GLS multiple 
regressions with White’s (1980) corrections. The Tobit regression is utilized to regress 
the computed efficiency scores against a set of restructuring measures and other bank-
specific characteristics as control variables under the following model: 
ijt j j j ijt ijt
ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt
ijt ijt ijt t t
t ijt ijt ijt ijt
ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt
PHIL KOR INDO LTD LATA
ROA NIITI CTI TCTA LLRL LTA ETA
ASSETS LISTED STATE IMF POST IMF DUR
CRISIS EFF FOR FOR EFF A M A M
REPRIV EFF RECAP RECAP CLOSED RESTR
ε β β β β β
β β β β β β β
β β β β β
β β β β β
β β β β β β θ
+ + + + +
+ + + + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + + + + + =
27 26 25 24 23
22 21 20 19 18 17 16
15 14 13 12 11
10 9 8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0
ln _ _
_ _ & &
_
                   (Equation  3.3) 
  14where, subscripts i  denote individual banks, j countries, t time horizon and other 
variables are defined with expected signs in Table 3.1 (Panel D). 
 
Table 3.1   Variable Definitions (Equations 3.1 and 3.3)  
 
Variable Definition  Expected 
sign 
Panel A:       Inputs 
Purchased funds   Customer deposits, money market funding & other funds   
Labor Personnel  expenses   
Physical capital  Book value of fixed assets   
Panel B:      Outputs 
Net loans  Total customer loans minus loan loss reserves   
Other earning assets  Placements with other banks , securities and investments   
Panel C:      Environmental variables 
Degree of monetization  Broad money (M2) divided by GDP (%)    
Density of demand  Total deposits of banking sector divided by area (km
2 )  
Population density  Number of inhabitants per km  
2  
Overall economic condition  GDP growth rate (%)   
Average asset quality  Total non-performing loans to total loans   
Panel D:      Tobit regression variables 
θ    Efficiency scores of banks (Dependent variable)  
0 β   Constant  
RESTR  A dummy variable for restructured banks during 1998-2002 +/- 
RECAP  A dummy variable for recapitalized banks during 1998-2002 +/- 
RECAP_EFF   A dummy variable for the years following the recapitalization +/- 
REPRIV  A dummy for recapitalized banks which were later reprivatized 
during 1998-2002 
+/- 
M&A   A dummy variable for a domestic bank that underwent at least one 
domestic merger or acquisition during 1998-2002  
+/- 
M&A_EFF  A dummy variable for the years following the M or A +/- 
FOR  A dummy variable for a bank that underwent at least one foreign 
acquisition or participation during 1998-2002 
+ 
FOR_EFF  A dummy variable for the years following foreign acquisition 
during 1998-2002 
+ 
DUR_IMF   A dummy variable for the years during IMF program (1998-2000) +/- 
POST_IMF   A dummy variable for the years following IMF program +/- 
STATE  A dummy variable for state-owned banks during 1991-2005 - 
LISTED  A dummy variable for listed banks during 1991-2005 +/- 
LnASSETS  Natural logarithm of total assets +/- 
ETA  Total equity to total assets + 
LTA  Gross loans to total assets  
LLRL  Loan loss reserves to total loans - 
CTI   Cost to income - 
NIITI  Non-interest income to total income  + 
ROA  Profits before tax to total assets  + 
LATA  Liquid assets to total assets  +/- 
LTD   Gross loans to total deposits and money market funding  +/- 
INDO, KOR, PHIL  A dummy for Indonesia, Korea, and Philippines, respectively   
ε   Error term   
 
  15The period 1998-2002 (two years after the IMF programs) is chosen for 
consideration in defining the variables indicating the four restructuring measures (closure, 
recapitalization, merger and acquisition, and foreign participation). There are two main 
reasons for this choice. First, although a majority of banks underwent at least one of the 
four restructuring measures during 1998-2000, several banks were recapitalized, 
consolidated or reprivatized later (in 2002). Second, a three-year horizon should be 
sufficient for assessing such restructuring measures in their post-event period. 
 
Table 3.2   Banking and Environmental Variables by Country (1991-2005)    
This table presents the mean values and standard deviations of the means (over 1991-2005) of selected 
banking and environmental variables used for the efficiency assessment model. All financial variables 
were converted into United States dollar (US$) values (using average annual exchange rates for each year), 
and then adjusted for inflationary effects using each country’s gross domestic product deflator (GDPD).  
 Indonesia  Korea  Philippines  Thailand 
  Mean  Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev
Panel A:      Banking variables (US$ millions) 
Purchased funds  3686.1  7065.3 20103.4 23485.1 1842.2 2014.45 10718.5 9308.58
Labour expense  47.73  88.87  218.44 239.87 31.85 35.04 90.34 86.69 
Fixed assets  74.48  130.8  580.22 532.94 76.92 104.48 403.85 360.75
Net loans  2437.6  5213.9 14769.8 18502.4 1220.8 1309.07 8823.7 8109.39
Other earning assets  1268.4  2815.5 7166.2 6980.6 852.18 899.09 2189.3  2758.28
              
Panel B:       Selected environmental variables 
Broad money to GDP (%)   51.73  6.46 109.32 18.98  53.35 9.28  90.20 11.99 
Banking deposits over     
     area (km ) (US$’000) 
2
41.57  9.99  2961.5 1842.4 112.66 34.89 225.38 40.17 
Number of inhabitants per   
     km  
2 106.69 5.96  462.99 15.66  242.60 21.74 116.93  5.18 
GDP growth rate (%)  3.94  5.74 5.63 4.07  3.76  2.09 4.70 5.15 
NPLs to Total loans  13.77  14.43 6.23  4.19 9.16 4.95 14.67  11.25 
 
Table 3.2 reports the average values of the five banking variables and five 
environmental variables disaggregated by country. There are significant variations in the 
banking variables among the four countries. Korean banks appear to dominate in all 
banking inputs and outputs, followed by Thai banks while the Filipino banks have the 
smallest values in these variables. For example, with respect to inputs, the average 
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purchased funds vary from US$ 1.8 billion in the Philippines to US$ 20 billion in Korea. 
On the outputs, while Indonesian banks provided US$ 2.4 billion of loans annually, 
while this figure of Thai banks is US$8.8 billion (Panel A). 
With respect to the environmental variables, Korea is the most monetized 
economy with a value of 109 percent for the ratio of broad money supply to GDP (Panel 
B). Similarly, Korea also has the highest average density of demand (measured by total 
banking deposits over area) followed by Thailand, and then the Philippines. In addition, 
Korea also has the highest period-average GDP growth rate (5.63 percent per year). 
Banks in Indonesia and Thailand suffered the most level of difficulties with higher non-
performing loan ratios, while Korean banks faced the least (Panel B).  
 
4.  DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
4.1 Technical  Efficiency   
The average values of the computed technical efficiency scores of all the sample banks 
under a common frontier are reported in Table 4.1.  
A preliminary observation reveals that an average efficiency score of 0.836 under 
the basic model (and 0.920 under the complete model) indicate that banks in the four 
selected East Asian countries experienced an inefficiency level of 16 percent (or 8 
percent under the complete model) relative to the best-practice (fully efficient) bank 
during the period 1991-2005 (Table 4.1, final row). In other words, this average input-
oriented efficiency level of 0.836 suggests that the East Asian banking systems could 
reduce by 16 percent inputs without changing outputs.  
Another observation is that, average efficiency of the sample banks without 
controlling for environmental differences (basic model) decreased by 8 percent, from 
0.855 before the IMF program to 0.776 during the IMF program, and then recovered to 
0.846 after the IMF program (Table 4.1, column 2). The average efficiency when 
controlling for environmental differences (complete model) appeared to be more stable,  
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Table 4.1  Technical Efficiency Scores: Basic and Complete Models 
 
 
Basic Model (without 
environmental variables) 
Complete Model (with 
environmental variables)   






1991  0.886 0.089  0.952 0.055  44 
1992  0.873 0.076  0.933 0.073  78 
1993  0.881 0.078  0.925 0.071  102 
1994  0.858 0.088  0.885 0.082  114 
1995  0.854 0.090  0.888 0.094  119 
1996  0.797 0.127  0.925 0.088  120 
1997  0.836 0.097  0.923 0.087  111 
Pre-IMF  Mean  0.855 0.092  0.919 0.078  98 
1998  0.784 0.152  0.900 0.110  94 
1999  0.798 0.156  0.904 0.101  90 
2000  0.746 0.162  0.894 0.145  87 
Dur-IMF  Mean  0.776 0.157  0.899 0.119  90 
2001  0.829 0.118  0.939 0.100  83 
2002  0.808 0.123  0.939 0.101  81 
2003  0.875 0.096  0.937 0.078  76 
2004  0.853 0.096  0.945 0.075  72 
2005  0.864 0.093  0.952 0.061  55 
Post-IMF  Mean  0.846 0.105  0.942 0.083  73 
All-year  Mean  0.836 0.118  0.920 0.088  88 
This table presents the mean, standard deviation, and count of the sample banks’ technical efficiency 
scores obtained from the estimations using the DEA input-oriented model under the CRS assumption 
(Equation 3.1). The Basic Model uses three inputs (purchased funds, labour costs, and physical capital), 
and two outputs (net loans and other earning assets). The Complete Model uses the same inputs and 
outputs, but also incorporates the five selected environmental variables (deposit density, degree of 
monetization, population density, overall economic condition, and asset quality). 
 
which slightly declined (-2 percent) during the IMF program, then rose by 4 percent in 
the post-IMF period (column 4). These scores suggest that the negative impact of the 
Asian financial crisis on banking efficiency was felt deeply during the crisis. 
The results also indicate that when environmental differences are taken into 
account, the average efficiency scores increase markedly in all three sub-periods 
compared to the scores from the basic model. On average, the mean efficiency scores 
under the complete model were 8.4 percent higher than those of the basic model (Table   19
                                                
4.1, final row). This finding supports the empirical evidence on cross-country banking 
efficiency that country-specific environmental conditions exercise remarkable influence 
on bank efficiency.
14  Our results, however, show narrower dispersions (standard 
deviations) of efficiency scores under both models (9 percent compared to 20-25 percent 
in those studies), suggesting a more homogeneous sample used in this study. In addition, 
our control of the fifth environmental variable (asset quality of the banking sector) raised 
the average efficiency score by 2.7 percent suggest that it is important to consider the 
level of difficulties that each banking system faces, particularly in their financial turmoil.  
To further investigate the impact of the IMF-supported programs on bank 
efficiency, the computed efficiency scores are disaggregated by country (Table 4.2). As 
revealed, whether controlling for environmental differences or not, Thai banks, on 
average, were the most efficient, followed by the Filipino banks. On the other hand, 
Indonesian banks were the least efficient under both models.  
The results (Panel A: Basic Model) also show that average efficiency decreased 
during the crisis (thus the IMF program). Indonesian banks were the most affected by the 
crisis, experiencing a reduction of 17 percent in their average efficiency scores, followed 
by Thai banks (6 percent), and Korean banks (4 percent). The Filipino banks, on the 
other hand, being not much affected by the crisis, were able to maintain their pre-IMF 
efficiency level of 0.85 (Panel A, Column 3). In the post-IMF period, banks (except 
those in the Philippines) were able to retrieve their pre-IMF efficiency level. Korean 
banks even obtained their efficiency level of 0.895, or 9.5 percent higher than that prior 
to the IMF program.  
When environmental variables are taken into account, a similar trend is found for 
the banks in Indonesia, Thailand and Korea with their efficiency reduction of 6 percent, 
2 percent and 1.5 percent respectively during the IMF program (Panel B: Complete 
Model). It is interesting that the average efficiency the Filipino banks even rose by 1.5  
 
14 See, for instance, Chaffai et al. (2001), Lozano-Vivas et al. (2002), and Kasman et al. (2005).      Table 4.2  Technical Efficiency Scores by Country    
     Panel A:  Basic Model (without environmental variables) 
Year Indonesia  Korea  Philippines Thailand  All-country 
1991 0.861  0.879  0.838  0.930  0.886 
1992 0.865  0.825  0.863  0.928  0.873 
1993 0.883  0.826  0.876  0.891  0.881 
1994 0.877  0.789  0.844  0.911  0.858 
1995 0.868  0.783  0.855  0.907  0.854 
1996 0.793  0.723  0.810  0.890  0.797 
1997 0.835  0.780  0.857  0.876  0.836 
Pre-IMF 0.855  0.801  0.849  0.905  0.855 
1998 0.672  0.745  0.883  0.890  0.784 
1999 0.683  0.801  0.876  0.851  0.798 
2000 0.693  0.754  0.788  0.799  0.746 
Dur-IMF 0.683  0.767  0.849  0.847  0.776 
2001 0.809  0.857  0.826  0.847  0.829 
2002 0.767  0.886  0.810  0.833  0.808 
2003 0.864  0.921  0.854  0.876  0.875 
2004 0.846  0.893  0.825  0.863  0.853 
2005 0.821  0.915  0.842  0.891  0.864 
Post-IMF 0.822  0.895  0.831  0.862  0.846 
All-year Mean  0.809  0.825  0.843  0.879  0.836 
 
       Panel B:  Complete Model (with environmental variables) 
Year  Indonesia Korea  Philippines Thailand  All-country 
1991  0.926 0.972 0.946 0.962  0.952 
1992  0.928 0.893 0.940 0.970  0.933 
1993  0.914 0.880 0.944 0.962  0.925 
1994  0.904 0.841 0.866 0.929  0.885 
1995  0.915 0.822 0.887 0.930  0.888 
1996  0.904 0.925 0.913 0.960  0.925 
1997  0.897 0.899 0.931 0.963  0.923 
Pre-IMF  0.912 0.891 0.918 0.954  0.919 
1998  0.844 0.893 0.940 0.923  0.900 
1999  0.874 0.849 0.934 0.958  0.904 
2000  0.841 0.883 0.925 0.928  0.894 
Dur-IMF  0.853 0.875 0.933 0.936  0.899 
2001  0.905 0.945 0.952 0.945  0.939 
2002  0.898 0.967 0.941 0.939  0.939 
2003  0.903 0.977 0.926 0.929  0.937 
2004  0.910 0.983 0.918 0.958  0.945 
2005  0.952 0.978 0.908 0.958  0.952 
Post-IMF  0.913 0.970 0.929 0.946  0.942 
All-year  Mean 0.893 0.912 0.917 0.945  0.920 
 
percent during the IMF program. As such, the environmental conditions exercise positive 
or negative effects on bank efficiency, at least during the crisis period. In the post-IMF 
period, while Indonesia banks were able to raise efficiency and almost regain their pre-
IMF level, Korean banks made a remarkable efficiency gain of 10 percent surpassing 
their pre-IMF level. Efficiency of the Filipino banks slightly deteriorated to just 1 
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percent higher than that prior to the IMF program. A very slight improvement in 
efficiency was found for Thai banks in this post-IMF period, but still 1 percent lower 
than that in the pre-IMF period. 
To further investigate the impact of the IMF-supported programs on bank 
efficiency, the sample banks’ period-mean efficiency scores by ownership types, listing 
status, and restructuring measures are reported in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3  Technical Efficiency Scores by Bank Ownership and Restructuring Measures    
Panel A:   Technical Efficiency by Ownership Characteristics and Listing Status 
  Ownership Listing  Restructuring 
 State  Private Foreign Listed  Unlisted Restructured 
Un- 
restructured
Basic Model  0.848 0.829  0.835  0.834  0.832  0.832  0.837 
Complete Model  0.916 0.909  0.932  0.921  0.905  0.922  0.917 
 
 Panel B:   Technical Efficiency by Restructuring Measures  
 Recapitalized  Merged  Foreign-participated 
  Before After
After 
re-privatized Before After Before  After 
Basic Model  0.839 0.827 0.858  0.863  0.843 0.829  0.849 
Complete Model  0.915 0.939 0.960  0.922  0.898 0.919  0.926 
 
In respect of performance by ownership, when environmental factors are not 
taken into account, there seems to have no distinctive differences among the three 
banking groups (state, private, and foreign-participated). This finding might not be 
consistent with the literature, particularly on positive effects of foreign ownership or 
participation. This phenomenon, however, is understandable in this case as these four 
East Asian countries have recently opened their banking sectors to further foreign 
ownership which has increased rapidly since 2002, their positive impact therefore, if any, 
may not have been realized. When environmental differences are controlled for, foreign-
participated banks and listed banks then could obtain a slightly higher technical 
efficiency score than their state-owned and unlisted counterparts respectively. There   22
                                                
seems to be no distinctive differences in technical efficiency performance among the 
banks which whether or not underwent restructuring (Table 4.3, Panel A).  
On efficiency performance by specific restructuring measures
15 (Table 4.3, Panel 
B), the efficiency level of the recapitalized and merged banks was below their pre-
restructuring level (Basic Model). There are some reasons for this. First, these banks had 
to strictly meet the governments’ various conditions when they were recapitalized or 
merged. One of the conditions was to take over the (good and bad) liabilities and assets 
from other compulsorily merged or nationalized banks. Another condition was to clean 
up their balance sheets, meaning write-off or sell their bad debts. These could have 
negative effects on their efficiency performance in the short-run.  
However, when environmental variables are considered, efficiency of the 
recapitalized banks was 2.5 percent higher than their pre-event level. In addition, nine 
recapitalized banks have been re-privatized since 2002, and their efficiency score (0.960) 
in the post-event period was 4 percent higher than their pre-event level under the 
complete model. Domestic mergers and acquisitions, on the other hand, experienced 
short-term efficiency loss. Technical efficiency of foreign-participated banks, on the 
other hand, slightly improved whether or not environmental differences are considered.  
 
4.2     Scale Efficiency 
If there appears a difference between the technical efficiency scores under the 
constant returns to scale (CRS) and variable returns to scale (VRS) assumptions, the 
bank has scale inefficiency. Scale efficiency thus could be obtained if the bank is 
operating at the optimal scale (or CRS), that is, where there are neither increasing returns 
to scale nor decreasing returns to scale. Scale efficiency (SE) thus can be calculated by 
 
15  We also conducted an evaluation of the efficiency performance of the closed banks prior to their 
closures. The results - available with the authors - indicated that their pre-closure performance was 
significantly worse than their unclosed counterparts, suggesting that the closure decisions were supported 
on economic grounds.   23
comparing the differences in technical efficiency (TE) scores generated under the CRS and 
VRS specifications. Table 4.4 displays the SE under both basic and complete models. 
 
Table 4.4  Scale Efficiency Scores: Basic and Complete Models    
 
 
Basic Model (without 
environmental variables) 
Complete Model (with 








1991  0.908 0.061 0.948 0.060  44 
1992  0.926 0.042 0.943 0.063  78 
1993  0.934 0.037 0.940 0.060  102 
1994  0.936 0.033 0.917 0.070  114 
1995  0.940 0.031 0.924 0.075  119 
1996  0.859 0.092 0.917 0.088  120 
1997  0.918 0.063 0.936 0.079  111 
Pre-IMF  Mean  0.917 0.051 0.932 0.071  98 
1998  0.860 0.097 0.911 0.115  94 
1999  0.863 0.092 0.922 0.094  90 
2000  0.811 0.114 0.906 0.151  87 
Dur-IMF  Mean  0.845 0.101 0.913 0.120  90 
2001  0.868 0.077 0.936 0.106  83 
2002  0.855 0.097 0.929 0.107  81 
2003  0.903 0.059 0.917 0.079  76 
2004  0.891 0.065 0.930 0.071  72 
2005  0.904 0.060 0.937 0.066  55 
Post-IMF  Mean  0.884 0.071 0.930 0.086  73 
All-year Mean  0.892  0.068 0.925 0.087  88 
 
The average scale efficiency of the sample banks for the whole period 1991-2005 
was 0.892 (basic model) or 0.925 (complete model). This means the sample banks 
deviated on average 11 percent or 7.5 percent from their efficient size of scale in both 
models respectively. Since the overall efficiency is a power of technical efficiency and 
scale efficiency, the relative sizes of these scores provide evidence on the source of 
inefficiency. When environmental factors are ignored, the overall period-mean technical    24
                                                
efficiency score (0.836) was 6 percent below the period-mean scale efficiency (0.892), 
suggesting that the technical factor in the sample banks was a relatively more important 
inefficiency source than the scale factor. However, when the environmental variables are 
taken into account, the difference in efficiency between the technical factor and scale 
factor was no longer present (Tables 4.1 and 4.4, final rows).  
With this scale efficiency specification, however, it is not clear whether the 
sample banks were operating in an area of increasing or decreasing returns to scale. To 
determine this and following Coelli (1996), an additional DEA problem with non-
increasing returns to scale (NIRS) imposed was run, and the scores under this NIRS 
assumption were compared with those under the VRS assumption. The results from these 
two assumptions on average were all different, suggesting that most sample banks on 
average were operating in increasing returns to scale regions.
16 One implication is that 
these East Asian banks could achieve significant cost savings and efficiency gains by 
increasing their scale of operations, which could be done via internal growth or 
continued consolidation in the sector. Consolidation exercises that had gone on after the 
crisis thus could be supported based upon this scale efficiency analysis.  
The scale efficiency scores by country are reported in Table 4.5. As it appears, 
when environmental differences are not considered (basic model), Thai banks on average 
were the most scale efficient (0.925) and Indonesian banks the least (0.876). Although 
the scale efficiency of Korean banks has slightly declined over time, it still could surpass 
that of Thai banks when environmental factors are taken into account (complete model). 
While the scale efficiency of the banks in both Indonesia and the Philippines was slightly 
(2 percent) higher under the complete model, that of Indonesian banks was the lowest 
(0.88-0.90) whether or not environmental factors were considered. 
 
16 A detailed investigation of the scale efficiency region for each individual bank is beyond the research 
objective of this paper; but this could be an interesting area for future research. When changes in efficiency by period are considered, the results under the basic 
model indicate that the average scale efficiency of all sample banks decreased by 7 
percent (from 0.917 to 0.845) during the IMF program, in line with their average 
technical efficiency. These banks (except those in the Philippines), however, could  
Table 4.5   Scale Efficiency Scores by Country    
Panel A:  Basic Model (without environmental variables) 
 






















Year Indonesia  Korea  Philippines Thailand All-  country 
1991 0.913  0.878  0.897  0.936 0.908 
1992 0.912  0.909  0.926  0.949 0.926 
1993 0.928  0.914  0.933  0.949 0.934 
1994 0.930  0.928  0.934  0.934 0.936 
1995 0.933  0.935  0.941  0.927 0.940 
1996 0.886  0.853  0.843  0.922 0.859 
1997 0.912  0.895  0.924  0.929 0.918 
Pre-IMF 0.916 0.902  0.914 0.935  0.917 
1998 0.826  0.801  0.889  0.925 0.860 
1999 0.812  0.855  0.887  0.929 0.863 
2000 0.787  0.780  0.822  0.857 0.811 
Dur-IMF 0.808  0.812  0.866 0.904  0.845 
2001 0.857  0.878  0.844  0.904 0.868 
2002 0.816  0.893  0.848  0.910 0.855 
2003 0.879  0.917  0.893  0.937 0.903 
2004 0.878  0.887  0.882  0.918 0.891 
2005 0.869  0.922  0.896  0.940 0.904 
Post-IMF 0.860  0.899  0.873 0.922  0.884 
All-year 0.876 0.883 0.891  0.925  0.892 
 
Panel B:  Complete Model (with environmental variables) 
Year  Indonesia Korea  Philippines Thailand All-country 
1991 0.951  0.961  0.925  0.957 0.948 
1992 0.933  0.955  0.919  0.964 0.943 
1993 0.919  0.956  0.923  0.964 0.940 
1994 0.909  0.959  0.845  0.955 0.917 
1995 0.920  0.955  0.866  0.954 0.924 
1996 0.909  0.921  0.892  0.945 0.917 
1997 0.902  0.946  0.947  0.948 0.936 
Pre-IMF 0.920  0.950  0.902 0.955  0.932 
1998 0.839  0.953  0.915  0.936 0.911 
1999 0.869  0.946  0.928  0.943 0.922 
2000 0.836  0.944  0.924  0.923 0.906 
Dur-IMF 0.848  0.948  0.922 0.934  0.913 
2001 0.910  0.964  0.942  0.930 0.936 
2002 0.903  0.959  0.931  0.924 0.929 
2003 0.908  0.929  0.916  0.914 0.917 
2004 0.915  0.935  0.908  0.963 0.930 
2005 0.957  0.930  0.898  0.963 0.937 
Post-IMF 0.918  0.943  0.919 0.939  0.930 
All-year 0.896 0.947 0.915  0.943  0.925 
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obtain almost their pre-IMF scale efficiency level in the post-IMF period. The scale 
efficiency of the Filipino banks, on the other hand, was 4 percent lower than that in the 
pre-IMF period. However, when environmental differences are controlled for, while the 
scale efficiency of Thai banks declined by 2 percent during the IMF program, then 
remained unchanged in the post-IMF period, that of Indonesian banks decreased the most 
by 7 percent during the IMF-program then recovered to their pre-IMF level in the post-
IMF period. The scale efficiency of Korean banks has slightly declined over time, that of 
Filipino banks, on the other hand, increased during the IMF program, and then declined 
in the post-IMF period, resulting in the same level as their pre-IMF positions (Table 4.5, 
Panel B).  
With regard to effects of bank ownership, listing status and restructuring 
measures on scale efficiency, when environmental differences are not considered (Basic 
Model), there seems no distinctive differences in scale efficiency between banks of 
different ownership forms, listing and restructuring status (Table 4.6, Panel A).  
 
Table 4.6   Scale Efficiency Scores by Bank Ownership and Restructuring Measures    
Panel A:   Scale Efficiency by Ownership Characteristics and Listing Status 
  Ownership Listing  Restructuring 







Basic Model  0.890  0.895  0.887  0.887  0.907 0.895 0.891 
Complete Model  0.939  0.919  0.912  0.928  0.896 0.927 0.903 
 
Panel B:  Scale Efficiency by Restructuring Measures 
 Recapitalized  Merged  Foreign-participated 
  Before After After  re-privatized Before After Before  After 
Basic Model  0.881 0.869 0.892  0.893 0.918 0.893  0.899 
Complete Model  0.896 0.925 0.939  0.912 0.921 0.911  0.919 
 
Nevertheless, when environmental factors are controlled for (Complete Model), 
state-owned banks, which are typically large in size, appear to have capitalized on their 
size advantage, resulting in superior scale efficiency. Listed and restructured banks also   27
slightly outperformed their unlisted and unrestructured counterparts in scale efficiency. 
This could be due to the market discipline effect for the listed banks, and size advantage 
for the restructured banks which have typically become larger after restructuring. 
On the effect of restructuring measures (Table 4.6, Panel B), there seems no 
restructuring effect on scale efficiency for the recapitalized and foreign-participated 
banks under both models. The banks which underwent mergers and/or domestic 
acquisitions appear to have capitalized on their size advantage in the post-event period.  
 
4.3.  Determinants of Bank Efficiency 
Due to the censored nature of the efficiency scores, the Tobit censored regression 
was used. In addition, GLS multiple regressions were also run, and consistent estimates 
of the covariance matrix allowing for heteroscedasticity were also computed following 
the White (1980) procedure as a robustness check, and for getting the explanatory power 
of the model. Following Baltagi (2005), tests for identifying multicollinearity (the 
Variance Inflation Factor test) and autocorrelation (the Durbin-Watson test) were 
conducted, and were able to confirm the normality of the dataset. Since the results from 
the Tobit and GLS regressions are quite similar with the majority of the coefficients 
being statistically significant and of the same sign, only the pooled Tobit regression 
results are reported and discussed. Its results are summarized in Table 4.7. 
 
4.3.1  Bank Restructuring and Efficiency 
The effects of the bank restructuring measures on efficiency are expressed by the 
estimated coefficients shown in Table 4.7 (Panel A). To capture the overall effect of the 
bank restructuring programs with IMF support, a Restructured dummy was used for 
determining if the restructured banks outperformed their unrestructured counterparts 
during 1991-2005. The reported positive but insignificant coefficient indicates that the 
restructured banks are not significantly more efficient than the unrestructured ones. This  Table 4.7  Tobit Regression Results on Determinants of Bank Efficiency (1991-2005) 
 
Dependent variable  Technical efficiency  Scale Efficiency 
 Coefficient  Std.Error t-statistic Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic 
Constant 0.4651  0.0489  9.22*** 0.3686  0.0406  9.18** 
Panel A: Restructuring measures          
Restructured 0.0079  0.0115 0.69  0.0132  0.0102  1.32 
Recap -0.0168  0.0092  -1.83*  -0.0105  0.0082  -1.29 
Recap_Eff 0.0271  0.0100  2.71***  0.0177  0.0089  2.02** 
Reprivatized 0.0162  0.0195  1.72*  0.0150  0.0174  1.69* 
M&A 0.0019  0.0083  1.23  0.0004  0.0073  0.06 
M&A_Eff -0.02658  0.011304 -2.37** -0.01879  0.0099  -1.89* 
Foreign  0.0012  0.0105  0.82   0.0048  0.0094   0.52 
Foreign_Eff   0.0152  0.0099  1.07   0.0137  0.0087   1.09 
Panel B: IMF-programs          
Dur_IMF  -0.051  0.020 -2.52** -0.0219  0.0141  -1.57 
Post_IMF 0.0114  0.0186  0.62  0.0051  0.0166  0.32 
Panel C: Bank (CAMEL-based) characteristics  
State -0.0003  0.0079  -0.05  0.0025  0.0069  0.82 
Listed 0.0021  0.0067  1.10  0.0058  0.0060  0.98 
LnAssets 0.0345  0.0020  11.37*** 0.0263 0.0018 14.99*** 
ETA 0.0042  0.0005  9.03***  0.0038  0.0004  9.31*** 
LTA 0.0001  0.0002  0.81  0.0002  0.0001  1.47 
LLRL -0.0047  0.0005  -8.62*** -0.0040  0.0005  -8.35*** 
TCTA -0.0001  0.0003  -0.33  -0.0006  0.0002  -0.04 
CTI -0.0002  0.0001  -2.60*** -0.0018  0.0001  -0.27 
NIITI 0.0058  0.0003  1.09  0.0017  0.0003  0.66 
ROA 0.0019  0.0017  1.71*  0.0017  0.0016  1.13 
LATA 0.0002  0.0002  0.95  0.0003  0.0002  1.46 
LTD 0.0002  0.0001  2.13**  0.0001  0.0001  1.29 
Panel D: Country dummies          
Indonesia -0.0361  0.0089  -4.34*** -0.0281 0.0079 -3.58*** 
Korea -0.0222  0.0104  -2.89*** 0.0004  0.0092  0.05 
Philippines -0.0211  0.0102  -2.48*** -0.0304 0.0091 -3.39*** 
Diagnostics           
Log likelihood function  1253.70    1630.36     
LR test    660.85    654.67     
Adjusted R
2
with year dummies  0.398    0.387     
without year dummies  0.375    0.371     
                  Number of cross-sections  138       
                   Number of time periods  15       
                Total (pooled, unbalanced) observations  1326       
This table presents results on the determinants of bank efficiency using the Tobit censored regression model (Equation 
3.3). The dependent variables are the calculated technical efficiency and scale efficiency scores (under the complete 
model, i.e., controlling for environmental differences). The independent variables are as defined in Table 3.1. Adjusted 
R taken from the generalized least squares using the same dataset. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respective
2
ly. 
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difference in profit efficiencies of the restructured and other domestic private banks in either 
short or long-term.  
With regards to performance effects of specific restructuring measures, the 
recapitalization effect is captured by the use of three dummies. The first dummy Recap was 
applied to assess whether the recapitalized banks were efficient relative to the un-
recapitalized ones over the restructuring period (1998-2002). The second dummy Recap_Eff 
was used to evaluate a short-term effect, that is, if these banks have become more efficient 
after recapitalization. The third one, Reprivatized, was aimed at assessing a short-term 
efficiency effect on those banks which were initially recapitalized, but reprivatized in later 
years. The reported coefficients of the first dummy Recap are negative, and statistically 
significant at 5 percent level for technical efficiency suggesting that these recapitalized 
banks were significantly less efficient than their un-recapitalized counterparts during the 
whole period analyzed. Bank recapitalization and reprivatization, however, yielded short-
term efficiency gains as evidenced by the positive and significant coefficients of Recap_Eff 
and Reprivatized.   
The next restructuring measure which involved domestic bank mergers and 
acquisitions is captured by the two binary dummies, M&A and M&A_Eff. The first dummy 
M&A was to assess efficiency of the banks which underwent any domestic mergers and/or 
acquisitions between 1998 and 2002, while the second dummy M&A_Eff was to evaluate if 
these banks have become more efficient after their mergers and/or acquisitions. The reported 
coefficients of M&A are positive, but insignificant for both technical and scale efficiencies 
suggesting that the efficiency performance of the banks that experienced mergers and/or 
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mergers and acquisitions, however, experienced significant short-term efficiency loss. This 
could be due to their unsuccessful alignments of corporate culture and management 
practices in the initial post-merger period. This finding is consistent with Shih (2003) that 
merging two banks weakened by the Asian financial crisis or even merging one weak into a 
healthier one in many cases would result in a weaker bank (p. 31). 
The outcome of the final restructuring measure which involved foreign acquisition is 
examined via two other dummies, Foreign and Foreign_Eff. The first dummy Foreign was 
employed to evaluate efficiency of the banks which underwent any foreign acquisition or 
participation between 1998 and 2002, while the second one Foreign_Eff was used to see if 
these banks have become more efficient after their foreign acquisitions. The reported 
coefficients show that banks which underwent foreign acquisitions had insignificantly 
higher technical and scale efficiency compared to those which did not, and similar results for 
the short-term effect. This finding again supports the observation by Williams and Nguyen 
(2005) who report no evidence of “cherry-picking” of foreign banks in the South East Asian 
banking markets during 1990-2003, and also suggest that efficiency gains associated with 
foreign ownership might take longer time to be realized. 
During the IMF program period (1998-2000), the sample banks’ efficiency was 
significantly lower than that in the pre-IMF period (1991-1997), suggesting the negative 
crisis effect (thus the IMF programs). These banks were able to recover their efficiency level 
in the post-IMF period, but insignificantly different from their pre-IMF level. This suggests 
that the Asian financial crisis has created long-term negative effect and bank efficiency 
gains associated with the IMF programs might have taken longer time to be realized. 
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Table 4.7 (Panel C) provides the findings on the influences of bank-specific 
characteristics (ownership, listing status, and CAMEL-based measures) on efficiency. The 
results indicate that there was no significant difference in efficiency between state-owned 
banks and domestic private-owned ones. Foreign-participated banks, as indicated in section 
4.3.1, had insignificantly higher technical and scale efficiency compared to the state-owned 
and other private-owned banks. No significant impact of stock exchange listing on 
efficiency was observed. This could be due to the fact that market discipline might not exert 
effects on efficiency in developing and crisis-hit economies as in this study, especially 
where 46 percent of the sample banks are not listed. This finding is broadly in line with 
Laeven (1999) which reports a statistically insignificant relationship between stock market 
listing and efficiency of East Asian banks during 1992-1996. 
With regard to the influence of CAMEL-based measures on efficiency, the 
coefficients in Table 4.7 (Panel C) suggest that bank size, capitalization, earnings, and 
liquidity significantly and positively affected bank efficiency. These results confirm large 
banks’ scale efficiency as previously discussed in Section 4.2. The significantly positive 
coefficient for capitalization (ETA) is consistent with the argument that banks with high 
efficiency will have higher profits and hence will be able to retain more earnings as capital 
(Carvallo and Kasman 2005, p. 70). The positive coefficient for earnings (ROA) suggests 
that more profitable banks were also more efficient. The coefficient for liquidity (when 
measured by loans to deposits, LTD) is significantly positive in terms of technical efficiency, 
indicating that higher fund utilization relative to fund-raising was important for banks to 
improve efficiency. This lending capability, however, is two-sided since increased loans 
  31may lead to more credit risks, thus higher non-performing loans and higher operating costs if 
a good risk management system is not in place. This can explain why other financial 
measures (loan loss reserves to loans, LLRL; and cost to income, CTI) significantly and 
negatively influenced bank efficiency. 
 
4.3.3  Geographical Location and Bank Efficiency 
The coefficients of the country dummies in Table 4.7 (Panel D) show that Indonesian 
and Filipino banks were significantly less efficient than Thai banks in both technical and 
scale efficiency (at 1 percent level). Korean banks, on the other hand, were significantly less 
efficient than Thai banks in technical efficiency only. This suggests that Thai banks on 
average were the most efficient among those in the four selected countries. 
Finally, when the year dummies (except those years which were covered by the 
dummy  Dur-IMF) were included into the regression, the adjusted R-squared statistic 
increased by only 2.3 percent (technical efficiency model) and 1.6 percent (scale efficiency 
model), indicating very marginal impact of the time trend on efficiency (Diagnostics in 
Table 4.7). A closer look at each of the year dummies reveals that three years (1995, 1996, 
and 1998) had a significantly negative influence on bank efficiency, suggesting some 
downward trend in efficiency before and during the crisis. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
This paper examined the efficiency performance of banks over the pre- and post-
restructuring periods in four crisis-hit East Asian economies subjected to the IMF-supported 
restructuring programs. We selected a sample of 138 commercial banks in the four crisis-hit 
  32East Asian economies (Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand) and examined the 
restructuring effects over the pre- and post-restructuring years during 1991-2005.  
To achieve this objective, both nonparametric and regression models were employed. 
First, the nonparametric DEA was used to estimate technical efficiency and then scale 
efficiency, incorporating environmental (country) differences. Second, these estimated 
efficiency scores were regressed on bank restructuring measures, IMF programs and bank-
specific control variables, using the Tobit and generalized least squares (GLS) regressions.  
The results indicate that, overall, East Asian banks’ efficiency improved in the post-
IMF period, but only reached their pre-IMF levels. The restructured banks were not 
significantly more efficient than their unrestructured counterparts, and different restructuring 
measures had significantly different effects on bank efficiency. Specifically, bank 
recapitalization (and then re-privatization in certain cases) yielded significant short-term 
efficiency gains; mergers and acquisitions, on the other hand, experienced significant short-
term efficiency losses; and positive but insignificant effects of foreign participation on 
efficiency, which suggests that any potential benefits of foreign ownership may take longer 
time to be realized. 
Some policy implications can therefore be drawn from this paper. Bank restructuring 
during the financial crisis is required; but importantly, well-designed measures are vital to 
ensure its success. Bank mergers and acquisitions need to be scrutinized. Recapitalization 
and re-privatization are supported as a means for performance improvement. Foreign 
participation should be encouraged, although its potential benefits may take longer time to 
be realized. To reap these potential benefits, stronger economic reforms of the host countries  
should be further pursued.
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